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This article examines the ways in which the structures of norms of the 
British administration of civil law in colonial India constructed the 
meanings and definitions of corruption. Its evidentiary base is founded 
upon the analysis of several particularly notorious and complicated 
corruption cases from the early 1820s; that is, the cases administered 
by William Hockley, a British judicial administrator who was charged 
with bribery and corruption of panchayat cases. While his actions may 
have come under scrutiny at any other time, his malfeasance in office in 
1820-1 was considered to be especially serious because they arose 
within the first years of the British occupation of the Deccan. Thus, the 
record of the investigation, including, petition and interrogations, is 
both extensive and unique for this period.   
   
Through an analysis of these complaints, it is argued that the British 
norms brought to the new judicial arrangements in the Deccan were 
adopted, re-shaped, and reconstructed by Indian litigants who sought 
to pursue their cases in British-administered panchayats. Their cases 
focus upon the construction of stories that fit the new administration’s 
definition of justice, equity, and fairness. 
 
 Corruption has been defined and described in any number of ways. In most  
definitions, ‘political’ corruption has been taken as the standard unit of analysis. 
Thus, some of the most common attempts to define corruption describe it as the 
supersession of the public interest by private interests, the abuse of public political 
offices for personal gain, or the use of public offices as an income-producing unit.50 
Equally, nearly all definitions assert that corruption can only be judged against a set 
of norms that circumscribe proper behavior in public office.  
 
 Less common, however, has been the attempt to closely analyze the normative 
standards employed by the victims; that is, the standards by which victims of 
corruption evaluated, recognized, and even sought to adapt to corrupt practices. The 
cases presented here seek to analyze these practices, but in a rather unusual setting. 
In the first instance, it expands upon the most common descriptions of political 
corruption by highlighting the problem of judicial corruption. Rather than subsume 
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judicial corruption into the political sphere, this analysis of judicial corruption 
presents a unique opportunity to discuss the evolution of contemporary norms of 
justice, equity, and fairness, key rhetorical elements of British sovereignty in India. 
Thus, close attention is paid not only to the practice of corruption, but also to the 
languages and meanings that were created to explain and comprehend what 
contemporaries considered to be legitimate and illegitimate behavior. 
 
 Second, these cases occurred at a unique historical juncture, during the early 
nineteenth century when British control of western India expanded significantly and 
new methods and systems of judicial administration were being tested and 
implemented. It thus presents an opportunity to assess both transnational and cross-
cultural perceptions of justice and corruption. Corruption had long been a key 
concern of the British East India Company, but its importance in the governance of 
India had been given even greater emphasis by the impeachment and trial of Warren 
Hastings, governor-general of Bengal, which dragged on between 1787-1795. Key 
elements in this trial were charges of corruption through bribery and extortion, 
charges from which Hastings was eventually exonerated.51 Nevertheless, the legacy 
of this trial and therefore the relationship between the East India Company and the 
British Parliament clearly made Company officials quite sensitive to similar 
instances of corruption during the first decades of the nineteenth century. 
 
 Finally, the cases examined below occurred at the local level and thus can 
provide a view of corruption and its effects from the ground up, as it were. Principal 
among the new methods of administration in this early period was the attempt to 
incorporate local panchayats (or village councils) into the British system of justice. 
These case studies thus can provide access to popular conceptions of corruption and 
justice, an aspect of the study of corruption that heretofore has been neglected in 
historical enquiries in favor of discussions of the analysis of corruption in high 
political or socio-economic theory.52 Therefore, this article examines several cases of 
British judicial corruption for evidence of how contemporary standards of justice 
and equity in western India were transgressed,  how the victims’ notions of 
corruption were created and developed, and the role of British administrators in this 
process. 
 
 Unique among the studies of modern corruption in India, Akhil Gupta has 
sought to employ ethnographic analysis to interrogate the discourse of corruption 
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and its popular meanings in contemporary village India.53 Key among Gupta’s 
insights has been the recognition that discourses of corruption can be deployed not 
only “as a means to demonstrate how the state comes to be imagined”54 by citizens 
and subjects, but also as a “fecund signifier” of “conflicting systems of moral and 
ethical behavior.”55 Such insights can be applied equally albeit with care to the study 
of corruption during the early colonial era. During this period, western Indian society 
found itself enmeshed not only in competing concepts of the state, but in the rapid 
transformation of administrative structures and governing practices. In this situation, 
western Indian litigants struggled to comprehend and adapt to the changing legal and 
judicial environment as East India Company institutions replaced those of the former 
Peshwa. Simultaneously, British Company officials sought to comprehend “native” 
judicial institutions and adapt their ‘rule of law’ to them. 
 
 In this remarkably fluid space, not only were openings created for new 
practices of corruption, but also concepts and discourses of justice and corruption 
necessarily became contested and the site of conflict.56 In the cases examined below, 
attention is paid to both of these elements. As Gupta notes, “the ‘system’ of 
corruption is of course not just a brute collection of practices whose most 
widespread execution occurs at the local level. It is also a discursive field that 
enables the phenomenon to be labeled, discussed, practiced, decried, and 
denounced.”57 Thus, an understanding of the colonial origins of concepts and 
practices of corruption may be understood as essential to an understanding of their 
modern iterations. Equally important, however, is the fact that this mode of analysis 
is an especially appropriate one for the examination of legal cases. For quite some 
time now, there has been a confluence between the study of law and the study of 
narrative.58 It is no longer unique to describe case-law analysis as the study of 
competing stories, or of the imaginative reconstructions of events, or the 
transactional relationships between narrators and their audiences. Indeed, the cases 
presented below should not necessarily be taken as expressions of ‘fact,’ but as 
stories created to convince and persuade a specific audience, in these cases, the 
regional East India Company officials to whom they appealed their complaints. 
However, it is perhaps only in this guise that we can come to a clearer understanding 
of how litigants fashioned themselves before the courts, what expectations they 
brought to the judicial process, how they sought to adapt to the changing structures 
of judicial administration during this period, and how they formulated and expressed 
what they thought was just. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  Akhil Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the 
Imagined State,” American Ethnologist, vol. 22: no. 2 (1995), pp. 375-402; idem., “Narratives of 
Corruption: Anthropological and Fictional Accounts of the Indian State,” Ethnography, vol. 6: 
no. 1 (2005), pp. 5-34. 
54  Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries,” p 389. 
55  Idem., “Narratives of Corruption,” p. 7. 
56  For a compelling analysis in the African context of the ways in which the transition to 
colonialism opened new social and legal spaces, see Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social 
Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1998). 
57  Idem., “Blurred Boundaries,” p. 385. 
58  For just two of the more prominent scholarly examples, see Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds., 
Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) and 
in its historical iteration, see Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and 
their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). 
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 As is well-known, the panchayat, or village council, is a traditional forum for 
the adjudication of disputes common to Indian society. During the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, British administrators working for the East India 
Company, led by such powerful and influential men as Thomas Munro and 
Mountstuart Elphinstone,  roughly understood the panchayat to be an indigenous 
form of Indian arbitration although this perception was often confused as well with 
an understanding of the function of the panchayat as a type of ‘native jury.’ 
Undoubtedly, panchayats came in any number of forms and followed a variety of 
different customary practices. While the ideal-type of panchayat may have consisted 
of five male members, hence the derivation of the term from panch or five, it was 
not uncommon in the west of India to find panchayats of three, five, seven or 
sometimes even more members. Moreover, as Upendra Baxi and Marc Galanter 
noted several years, while some panchayats were very informal others could be quite 
formal and legalistic. “Some panchayats,” they wrote of pre-British era panchayats, 
“purported to administer a fixed body of law or custom; some might extemporize. In 
some places and some kinds of disputes, the process was formal and court-like. 
Some panchayats were standing bodies with regular procedures, but many of these 
tribunals were not formal bodies but more in the nature of extended discussions 
among interested persons in which informal pressure could be generated to support a 
solution arrived at by negotiation or arbitration.”59 British administrators recognized 
several advantages to the employment of panchayats over British courts. Most 
importantly, they saw in the panchayats a means by which to gain access to local 
customs, language, and knowledge as well as a means by which to provide cheap 
and efficient justice to their new subjects. Because they were perceived of as ‘native 
courts,’ informal, and free from the expensive and lengthy forms and pleadings 
common to the British legal system, the panchayat became a foundational element of 
the British judicial project in western India.  
 
 However, the panchayat system as practiced in pre-colonial western India was 
quite different from British preconceptions. In many disputes in the Bombay 
Presidency, especially those involving debts and rights to landed property, the 
panchayat adopted highly legalistic and formal practices. In such cases, documentary 
evidence was relied upon to establish legitimate claims and the panchayat was 
expected to produce several documents in turn establishing and explaining their 
decision. Moreover, panchayats were composed of representatives voluntarily 
selected by each party to negotiate a settlement rather than having the decision of 
their dispute left to a group of elders, disinterested parties, or judges.  
 
 The British emphasis on the role and functioning of the panchayats served to 
bureaucratize and regularize panchayat procedures. In particular, British authorities 
established certain standards of procedural justice that together came to constitute a 
‘fair’ panchayat. Reflecting some of the most common British practices of 
arbitration, these standards included the presentation and validation of written 
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documentary evidence. As we shall see below, the production of panchayat awards, 
bonds, and memos took on striking significance and became key elements in the 
construction and presentation of the narrative of litigants’ cases. In addition, as in the 
British common law of arbitration, litigants could not be forced into these 
proceedings. Thus, in panchayat cases, evidence of compulsion were key signifiers 
of injustice. Finally, the voluntary nature of panchayat proceedings in western India 
included the litigant’s authority to appoint their own representatives, or 
panchayatdars, to serve on the panchayat.  Such procedural justice therefore was 
deemed by British administrators to be an essential element of panchayat justice 
precisely because they were most comprehensible in terms of  British legal practices. 
As will be suggested below, Indian litigants responded by shaping their stories and 
cases upon precisely these issues. In part, these new narrative elements were 
constructed through the process of the British interrogation of witnesses and 
litigants, but they were equally constructed by the litigants themselves who sought to 
adapt their justice claims to British standards and practices. 
  
 As previously noted, according to British administrators, the great advantages 
of the panchayat over British courts lay in its access to local knowledge as well as its 
relative cheapness. While litigants were obligated to provide food and drink for the 
members of the panchayat during the time in which they met, the proceedings of the 
panchayat were not matters of court record. Thus, the litigants were spared the 
expense of travel to the British courts located in the major towns or cities as well as 
the costs of submitting evidence on official stamped paper. Perhaps of even greater 
importance was the fact that members of a panchayat, being local men of some 
standing, were possessed of the knowledge of local languages, personal experience, 
and understanding of local customs and practices that could never be fully acquired 
by British judges. Under British administration, the legal purview of panchayats was 
exceptionally broad.  Archival records indicate that they attempted to settle disputes 
regarding caste, marriage, maintenance, adoption, inheritance, personal injury, and 
employment. However, the panchayats were undoubtedly most active in the 
settlement of commercial disputes. To give but one example of many, in the 
Collectorate of Khandesh (now Jalgaon) to the north-east of Mumbai, in the first six 
months of 1826, more than half of the disputes settled by panchayats were cases 
concerning contracts and debts.60 
 
 While there is an extensive archival record of the attitudes, inspirations, and 
motivations of the British administrators who sought to invigorate the panchayats 
during the early colonial period, evidence of the attitudes and aspirations of Indian 
litigants is naturally much more difficult to come by. However, this is not altogether 
impossible. Indeed the most striking evidence of these attitudes survives in the 
petitions and appeals of litigants, especially in those cases involving alleged 
corruption or gross error, the only two grounds upon which panchayat awards could 
be appealed. The cases presented here thus open a unique window not only upon 
concepts of judicial corruption, but also upon litigants’ perception of and response to 
it. 
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 Such issues became prominent in the first years of the 1820s under the local 
administration of William Brown Hockley, an East India Company officer who was 
later charged and convicted of bribery and corruption in several panchayat cases. 
Considering the fact that Hockley’s malfeasance in office occurred during the very 
first years of the British occupation of the western Deccan, they came under special 
scrutiny and left a lengthy archival record that includes a number of petitions and 
interrogations that are unique for this period.  
 
 Hockley was an Assistant Collector stationed at Ahmadnagar east of Mumbai. 
The Collectorate of Ahmadnagar was a province that had only recently been ceded to 
the British by the Maratha Peshwa at the end of the third Anglo-Maratha War of 
1817-18. As such, the organization of British judicial administration was at this time 
in its very infancy. One of the primary judicial responsibilities of the Collector and 
his assistant was to promote the settlement of disputes through the convening of 
panchayats. Over the course of his brief tenure there in 1820 and 1821, Hockley 
proceeded to cajole, threaten, and intimidate members of panchayats as well as 
litigants in an effort to extort money from them. Eventually, he was tried, convicted, 
and dismissed from the service of the East India Company in 1823. 
 The case of Panderong Krishnu and Lumkray Bullal Narsawey v. Hungeykur 
and Khatgaonkur61 reveals not only the grievous intervention of Hockley, but it also 
lends significant credence to the argument that narratives of panchayat injustice were 
built upon notions of voluntariness, due process, and the valid representation of 
interests. Among the surviving documents from this case is a petition to the 
Governor-in-Council, Mounstuart Elphinstone, dated 26 December 1820.62 The 
dispute concerned the disposition of property after the transfer of power from the 
Peshwa to the British. However, in this case, the defendants were coolcurnee 
(kulkarni), that is, village accountants, whose office entailed lands and other 
perquisites for their support. The disposition of three villages near Ahmadnagar 
became the subject of this dispute after they had been seized by the British and two 
claimants, Panderong and Lumkray, on the one hand, and the Khatgaonkur, on the 
other, came forward to claim the lands. Subsequently, Hockley examined the papers 
presented by both claimants and granted the property to Panderong and Lumkray. 
 
 The situation  remained stable for almost eighteen months thereafter until a 
third claimant, the Hungeykur, appeared. He prevailed upon Hockley to call for 
Panderong and Lumkray to attend to him at the Ahmadnagar adalat. “We 
accordingly went,” Panderong and Lumkray wrote in their petition, “and explained 
the nature of the case, when we were directed to refer it to a punchaet [panchayat]. 
We represented that we had nothing to do with the Hungeykur, but without attending 
to this, the case was referred to a punchaet.” 
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 The element of compulsion in submitting to a panchayat became an important 
element in the British investigation of the case and, in effect, began to structure the 
nature of the investigation. Further investigations into Hockley’s actions left a 
remarkable record of interrogations of both Panderong and several members of the 
panchayat. Panderong testified that upon being ordered to submit the dispute with 
the Hungeykur to a panchayat,63 
 
I said, that I had nothing to do with the Hungaykur, that my Dispute 
was with the Khatgaonkur, and that I was ready to have a Punchayet 
with him. 
I had originally complained against the Khatgaonkur, who had placed 
my Papers in pledge with the Hungaykur, [which] had led to my 
Wuttun being ‘Zubted’ [attached], and he also wanted to establish it, 
that I was his Gaomashta or agent. 
Question – When you expressed your aversion to a Punchayet with 
the Hungaykur what reply did Mr. Hockley make? 
Answer – He said I must submit to one; and I at length was forced to 
agree. 
 
 Indeed the British investigation became less a matter of the story the 
witnesses wanted to tell and more of a matter of what the investigator wanted to 
hear. Panderong  and Lumkray tried to explain that as the discussion with Hockley 
had proceeded, “we then mentioned that as the matter related to a wutun64 it should 
be referred to the Jameedars [jamindars] and Gataururs65 (Village Officers) and that 
the Saheb [Hockley] on seeing their decision should issue such orders as were 
conformable to justice; this being the practice of our former Government and our 
country.”66 Hockley, nevertheless, ordered a panchayat “without listening to this.”67 
To the British interlocutor, therefore, the legitimacy of the panchayat as the proper 
forum in which to hear the case was not at issue. Instead, in the eyes of the British, it 
was whether or not there had been an element of compulsion in agreeing to a 
panchayat. Thus, the litigants’ testimony was directed along this line of inquiry. 
 
 The examination of Panderong also provides an interesting insight into 
precisely how members of a panchayat were selected by the parties. The process 
often was an exceedingly informal one as litigants endeavored to secure friends, 
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‘Examination’]. 
 
64  In Marathi, a ‘wutun’ indicated an hereditary estate often associated with a political office. 
65  Jamindars were local village judicial officials under the Peshwa. The term ‘gataururs’  may refer 
to members of a gota, or village assembly, a judicial body that had fallen out of use under the 
Marathas in favor of the panchayat. See V. T. Gune, The Judicial System of the Marathas 
(Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute: Poona, 1953), pp. 54-9.  
66  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, ‘Petition.’ 
67  Ibid.  
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relatives, or allies to serve as panchayatdars. Panderong explained that after meeting 
with Hockley68 
 
I went to search for members to sit in the Punchayet. I met Mahadjee 
Punt Joshee Poonakur in the Road and told him that I was seeking for 
Punchayetdars. He advised me to apply to Moro Madhoo Row 
Daishmookh of Wankooree. I then went to the Daishmookh’s house, 
told him I had been ordered to have a Punchayet, and could get no 
members, showed him my Papers and asked him to be one of my 
Punchayetdars to which he agreed, and also desired me to try and get 
Krishnajee Mahayun as the other. I accordingly proceeded to the house 
of the latter, and told him what I had before said to the Daishmookh 
and he in like manner consented to sit for me: the following day, I 
again attended at the Adawlut and gave in the names of my two 
Punchayetdars. 
 
 It was not uncommon for litigants from the countryside to rely upon the 
advice of others to secure members of their panchayat, as Panderong was forced to 
do. Since he was not a resident of Ahmadnagar, he had but little choice. As he noted, 
he “could get no members.” Unfortunately, unbeknownst to Panderong and 
Lumkray, Moro Madhoo Row was one of Hockley’s corrupt accomplices.69 At their 
first meeting, Panderong testified that “I was told by Moro Madhoo Row 
Daishmookh to bring 500 Rupees for Mr. Hockley. I replied that I knew nothing of 
Mr. Hockley, and the Daishmookh then said ‘Bring it to me, and I will place it in 
Hindoo Mull Sowkoers hands and get your Punchayet decided as you wish.’”70 
 
 One should not underestimate the sense of injustice engendered by this blatant 
act of corruption. Although the judicial systems under both the Marathas and the 
British were replete with payments, charges, and costs of all kinds – to draw up 
papers, to feed the members of a panchayat, to pay for travel to and housing near the 
court, or to feed a tugaza peon, to name but a few – normative concepts nonetheless 
required that justice not be for sale. In this regard, the obsession of British 
administrators with Indian corruption is untenable at best. When Panderong was first 
approached for the payment, he hesitated but reluctantly agreed. “As we had no 
resource,” the petitioner stated, “and the cause would not be tried without the 
payment of money, and as we were afraid of losing our wutun, we went round to 
different places, and having got our relations and a Waree to stand forword [sic], we 
paid four hundred rupees in cash thro’ the hand of the mediator (Moro Madhow Row 
Deshmookh).”71 Thus, while panchayats might very well be costly, the plaintiffs 
certainly were unprepared to entertain this extraordinary charge.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, ‘Examination.’ 
69  Moro Madhoo Row was eventually apprehended for his role in the case and agreed to testify 
against Hockley. See the letter of 4 May 1821, Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, MSA, EIC, 
Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
70  Ibid.  
71  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, ‘Petition.’ 
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 Shortly thereafter, even further demands for money were made upon them. 
This time, the plaintiffs balked at the payment. “The next morning,” Panderong 
testified, “after we had eaten something we went to the Adawlut where the 
Punchayetdars were sitting, and they began to examine us and Pungobha Dahorey [a 
member of the panchayat] told us the Hungaykurs [the defendant] had agreed to give 
1000 Rups., and unless we made up as much we should lose our suit. We said we 
could not command so much money, and that the Punchayetdars must act as they 
chose.”72 At this point, Panderong and Lumkray went back to Moro Madhoo Row 
and demanded their money back, a demand that appears to have been fulfilled but 
only after several attempts. The extent to which Panderong and Lumkray now acted 
out of resignation or principle is not altogether clear. Upon some readings, the 
testimony suggests that both sentiments were involved. Yet, once again, the fact that 
such extortion was contrary to contemporary standards of panchayat justice and not a 
matter common to the judicial business of the era needs to be noted. 
 
 Much of the remaining testimony from the case relates to the procedures 
adopted by the panchayat itself, the elements of judicial administration that 
especially occupied the British in western India. This testimony is especially 
revealing not only for the insight it gives into how the panchayat was expected to 
function, but also the circumstances that garnered attention most from British 
investigators.  As the discussions of the panchayat dragged on for over two months, 
Hockley inserted himself into the panchayat process by aborting the panchayat’s 
investigation and ordering it to produce an award. Although the dispute had evolved 
into one between Panderong and Lumkray, on the one hand, and the Hungeykur, on 
the other, the sitting panchayat sought to interview the plaintiff from the original 
case, the Khatgaonkur. According to the testimony of Rungo Moraishwer Dahorey, a 
panchayat member for the Hungeykur, early one morning, the panchayatdars were 
all called to meet at the adalat:73 
 
Mr. Hockley did come to the Adawlut about 11 o Clock. The whole of 
the Punchayetdars immediately went to him and represented to him 
‘that we require the Khatgaon Takleekur Coolkurnies before we could 
finish the “Sarounsh,” that the Hooly was at hand and that we therefore 
begged to be excused till it was over.’ M. Hockley snatched the papers 
from our hands with some abusive expressions, and told us to get 
along. We went into the Kucherry where we had been sitting to get our 
Inkstands &c, and whilst there, a Peon came & called us into the 
Adawlut. We obeyed the summons, and Mr. Hockley gave back the 
papers and said ‘There is no occasion to call the Khatgaon Tankleejurs. 
Prepare a sarounsh between these two (the Hungaykurs and 
Wagoondaykur) and let me have it immediately.’ We five persons 
accordingly went back and prepared a ‘Sarounsh’ to the best of our 
judgement. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, ‘Examination.’ 
73  Ibid. ‘Adalat,’ or court. 
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 Hockley’s interference was remarked upon in the interviews of other 
panchayat members and was a significant contravention of panchayat procedures.74 
Equally notable, however, was that fact that Hockley’s accomplice, Moro Madhoo 
Row, had long ago stopped attending the panchayat’s deliberations and had been 
sending his gumashta, or agent, to attend in his stead. This irregularity was 
compounded even further by the fact that Moro ultimately refused to sign the award, 
or sarounsh, and ultimately deputed his agent to do so. Both actions were later 
uncovered by the investigation into Hockley’s actions and both actions seriously 
undermined the legitimacy of panchayat justice. 
 Moro’s actions may very well have been an attempt to avoid further 
involvement in the case and perhaps insulate himself from possible prosecution. But 
the later investigators were clearly troubled by the fact that Moro had not sought 
Panderong and Lumkray’s permission to send an agent to attend the panchayat’s 
meetings and that he had not personally signed the sarounsh. Moro testified as to his 
role in the case on 16 April 1821:75 
 
The two Wagoodaykurs76 (Sumkrajee [Lumkray] Bullalls and 
Pandooruung Krishen) came to my house to ask me to sit as their 
member. I refused twice, but the third day when they met me in the 
street I agreed, and went to the Adawlut with them. I attended there 
several times, but did not look at the Papers and I appointed a 
Carkoon77 to sit on my part whose name is Shakoo Luximon Govindah 
an inhabitant of Ahmednuggur. 
 
Question – Did the Wagoodaykurs never tell you, that the Punchayet 
has not acted fairly towards them and that they had suffered injustice? 
Answer – Yes they did; they said that the Punchayet had not been fair. 
 
Question – What reply did you make to these observations? 
Answer – I told them not to trouble me, but to act as they thought best. 
 
Question – You were one of their Punchayetdars and why therefore 
should they not trouble you? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74  See the testimony of Mahadew Gondajee Saupkur, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, 16 April 1821, ‘Examination of Mahadew Gondajee Saupkur, 
Shroff, and member of the Punchayet,’ who noted “The whole of the members immediately went 
into the Adawlut with the Papers and represented to Mr. Hockley that the ‘Sarounsh’ was not 
ready, and that we required the Khatgaon Tankleekur Coolkurries before we could finish it. Mr. 
Hockley took the Papers, abused us, and told us to be gone, at the same time observing that the 
dispute had no connection with the Tankleekurs. We returned to the Kucherry where we had been 
sitting and about a quarter of an hour after a Peon came with the Papers and ordered us to prepare 
the ‘Sarounsh’ between the Wagoondaykur and Hungaykurs instantly.” 
75  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, 16 April 1821, ‘Testimony 
of Moro Madhoo Row, Deshmookh of Wankoree in the Turuff of Kuwelleenuggur.’ 
76  Wagoodaykurs here refers to Panderong and Lumkray, residents of the village of Wagooday. At 
various times in the petition and examinations, the village is spelled ‘Wajooray’, ‘Wagooday’, 
‘Wagoondy’, or ‘Wagoonday’. The spelling that occurs most frequently is ‘Wagooday,’ which I 
have adopted throughout to facilitate identification. 
77  A carkoon, carcoon, or karkun is a clerk or auditor. 
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Answer – I told them that my Goomashtee (who has signed the 
Sarounsh in my name) had acted like the others. 
 
Question – By whose authority did you put your Goomashtee into that 
Punchayet? 
Answer – I informed the other members that I could not attend, and 
therefore, with there [sic] permission, I sent my Goomashtee. 
  
Question – Did you ask the Wagoodaykurs permission to put in your 
Goomashtee? 
Answer – No I did not.  
 
Question – Did you ever tell the Wagoodaykur you had not signed the 
Sarounsh and give your reason for not doing so? 
Answer – I told him I had not signed the ‘Sarounsh’ but said nothing of 
my reason. 
 
Considering the procedural expectations of British judicial administrators, the 
connection drawn here between fairness and justice, on the one hand, and the valid 
representation of interests, on the other, is not surprising. In their eyes, Panderong 
and Lumkray had secured Moro’s services as their duly deputed member of the 
panchayat and his absence did much to de-legitimize the tribunal’s claim to those 
values. 
 
 Moro’s refusal to sign the award obviously disturbed other members of the 
panchayat as well. Krishnajee Mahajun, who served as a member of the panchayat 
for Panderong and Lumkray, testified that when Moro refused to sign the sarounsh, 
he refused as well. According to Krishnajee’s testimony, Moro “then said, if you will 
sign it first, I will do so afterwards. This I did, and he afterwards caused it to be 
signed by the hand of Shahoo Goomrah, his agent.”78 One of the Hungaykur’s 
members of the panchayat similarly testified that he had at first refused to proceed 
without Moro’s signature. Rungo Moraishwer Dahorey explained that Moro “said he 
had sworn not to do so. On hearing this Krishnajee Mahajun and myself likewise 
declared we would not put our names to it. At last he agreed to have it signed by one 
of his Dependants [sic] in his name, and then we did so.”79 
 
 The apparent dismay caused by the failure of Moro to sign the award further 
underlines the importance attached to the elements of procedural justice needed to 
legitimate an award.  However, it also underlines the ambivalence many 
panchayatdars may have brought to their service on these tribunals. Panchayat cases 
could be long, complicated, and conflictual, as this case certainly was. Service on a 
panchayat could bring one into conflict with the litigants themselves as well as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, 16 April 1821, ‘Testimony 
of Krishnajee Mahajun, member of the Punchayet on the part of Nareesawaz.’ 
79  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, 16 April 1821, ‘Testimony 
of Rungo Moraishwer Dahorey, member of the Punchayet..’ 
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judicial authorities. There was a certain sense of frustration and resignation in 
Krishnajee Mahajun’s voice when he was interviewed by the British authorities:80 
 
Question – Has the Wagoondaykur Nareesawuz ever complained to 
you since or not? 
Answer – Sunkrajee Bullall did complain to me of the manner in which 
I decided for him and [I] reminded him that I had asked Mr. Hockley to 
send for the Khatgaon Tankleekur Coolkurnies, and as he had refused I 
could do nothing else. 
  
 Further evidence from this case does not survive, however, other cases 
corrupted by Hockley also explicate the relationship between British corruption and 
the claims to procedural justice during this era. For example, the case of Sukhoo 
Punt Apte v. Nilkunt Myraul came to the attention of William Chaplin, the 
Commissioner of the Deccan, in April 1820 and had its origination in a suit filed  by 
Sukhoo Punt to collect his portion of the revenue returns from two districts in the 
subha, or province, of Joonur. 81 Sukhoo Punt held these returns in partnership with 
Nilkunt Myraul.82 Chaplin, whose initial letter is lost, apparently requested Henry 
Pottinger, the Collector of Ahmadnagar, to inquire into the case, which somehow 
had resulted in Sukhoo Punt’s imprisonment for debt. Relying upon information 
supplied by Hockley, Pottinger replied that Sukhoo Punt’s imprisonment had been 
the result of two separate panchayat investigations and decisions. Pottinger explained 
that the first panchayat had found in favor of the Sukhoo Punt, but had not settled 
upon the exact amount of award. This led the defendant, Nilkunt Myraul, to deposit 
approximately Rs. 1500 with a local goldsmith to settle the debt. A second 
panchayat was then assembled to establish the exact amount, an award which 
eventually totaled Rs. 1326.3.25. Thus, according to the second panchayat, Sukhoo 
Punt owed Nilkunt just over Rs. 653. According to Pottinger, Sukhoo Punt then 
protested that the money had never been put into his account with the goldsmith, but 
since he could offer no proof and also refused to pay the amount in question, he was 
imprisoned for debt. 
 
 In December 1820, Sukhoo Punt was released from prison when Nilkunt 
stopped paying for his daily sustenance.83 He immediately went to Pottinger and 
complained that the final award had not been duly signed by all the members of the 
panchayat. Pottinger reviewed the sarounsh and “was equally vexed and astonished 
to find that it was not properly authenticated.”84 He then wrote to his subordinate, 
Arthur Crawford, asking him to find out why the sarounsh had not been signed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80  MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3, 16 April 1821, ‘Testimony 
of Krishnajee Mahajun.’ 
81  Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 25 April 1820 and Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 4 
November 1821, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
82  Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 4 November 1821, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
83  Under the East India Company’s regime, imprisonment for debt was supported only so long as 
the debtor’s sustenance was paid for by the creditor. In the 1820s, this rate was fixed at 2 annas 
per diem. 
84  Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 27 January 1821, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
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all the members of the panchayat. “A Person called Succoo Puntaply,” Pottinger 
wrote to Crawford, “who has been confined in jail at this place for some time for 
debt having been lately released he appealed against the award of the Punchayet 
under which he was imprisoned and on examining that document, I find that one of 
the members (and that too the only one on the part of the appellant) has not signed 
it.”85 Pottinger, beginning to doubt Hockley’s initial report, concluded rather 
ominously that “I have also other reasons to doubt the fairness of that award.”86 
 
 In fact, Pottinger had only just begun to uncover the web of intrigue and 
extortion that marked Hockley’s tenure in Ahmadnagar and that had relied upon the 
manipulation of panchayat justice. As we shall see, Chaplin also had begun to sense 
the extent of Hockley’s malfeasance and within several months would request a 
formal investigation of his actions by a Bombay solicitors’ firm. Pottinger’s initial 
investigation revealed that the dispute had begun about two years previously and that 
the litigants had taken their case to a panchayat, which awarded the plaintiff just over 
Rs. 712. Hockley had correctly noted that Nilkunt claimed to have deposited Rs. 
1500 worth of gold with a banker, or sahukar, in Pune. However, he had not 
informed Pottinger that the panchayat had also examined the banker and had found 
that the gold had not been deposited as a security against Sukhoo Punt’s claim, but 
for another purpose altogether. “It was proved,” Pottinger wrote, “that the deposit of 
Gold related to quite a different affair, and had only been brought forward in this 
instance to mislead the members of the Punchayet, whose decision in every respect 
was final, and apparently very just.”87 In fact, Nilkunt’s deposit was made into the 
account of the Pune province and not the Junoor province, which he shared with 
Sukhoo Punt, and “the accounts of the two Soobhas were necessarily to be kept 
distinct from the very agreements made by the Parties with the Paishwa’s 
Government.”88 
 
 At this point, Hockley interfered in the panchayat proceedings once again and 
appointed a pair of arbitrators and an umpire to review the original award. The 
encouragement of dispute resolution through British-styled arbitration had been a 
standard aspect of British judicial administration in all of the Indian presidencies at 
least since the passage of the Bengal Regulations in 1793. In Pottinger’s view, the 
appointment of arbitrators was not in and of itself inappropriate, if they were 
appointed only to examine whether the gold was indeed intended as security. 
Hockley, however, ordered the arbitrators to review the entire award and as such 
clearly went beyond their legitimate purview. The validity of the award, Pottinger 
reasoned, was not in question here and could not be appealed. The precise amount in 
dispute, however, could be subject to arbitration. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  Henry Pottinger to Arthur Crawford, 23 December 1820, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 27 January 1821, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
88  Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 4 November 1821, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
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 The arbitrators, as we have seen, subsequently reviewed the entire award and 
found in favor of Nilkunt for an amount of just over Rs. 650. For Pottinger, however, 
equally unnerving was the fact that the award was not signed by all of the arbitrators. 
Moreover, there were indications that this new award had been written without the 
concurrence of one of the arbitrators and contrary to the full tribunal’s initial 
recommendations. Pottinger explained that Sukhoo Punt’s claim had been fully 
supported by the first panchayat, but Hockley had seriously mishandled the 
subsequent inquiry by the arbitrators. After the first award, Pottinger wrote,89 
 
The only thing therefore that remained to be done, was to see the award 
of the Punchayet enforced, but instead of this, it now would appear the 
[sic] Mr. Hockley allowed two persons, who ought to have been simply 
charged with ascertaining the truth or falsity of the assertion about the 
Gold, to enter into scrutiny of the sarounsh of the Punchayet, and after 
setting aside some items, and deducting from others, a second sarounsh 
was submitted to Mr. Hockley by one of the members, in which the 
charge of 1500 Rupees for Gold was admitted, on a copy of a 
memorandum (‘Yadachee Nukl’90) and consequently the Plaintiff 
instead of having to receive the sum stated in the 3rd Paragraph [of this 
letter], was brought in as debtor to the amount of 651.[0].50. 
  
The sarounsh was, as I have said above, presented to Mr. Hockley by 
one of the two arbitrators and the ‘Aspree’ or Umpire, and that 
Gentleman I am informed sent for the other member (if such he can be 
called) and demanded from him why he did not subscribe his name to 
the Paper. The man replied that the award was unjust and that it had 
been prepared by the arbitrator and the umpire without his concurrence; 
that a Draft of their real sentiments as settled by all three, was then in 
his hand, and that he would not sign what he knew to be false and 
illegal. 
 
 Pottinger’s further investigations revealed not only that the new award was 
improper and not duly signed, but also that the arbitrators had relied upon an 
unsubstantiated memorandum in order to reach their decision. Quoting from the 
arbitrators’ award, Pottinger discovered that the banker had been called before them 
to produce any documents he had relating to the gold account.  When the banker 
replied that he did not have any, the arbitrators asked the same of Nilkunt. Nilkunt 
then submitted a copy of a memorandum purporting to support his claim. Pottinger 
was clearly aggravated by such unorthodox procedures. “It appears,” he wrote, “even 
from the document, that the Gold was admitted on a copy of a memorandum given in 
by Nilkunt Myraul and which should have been utterly rejected on every principle of 
just arbitration, for had it been proper to receive an alleged copy of a Paper on either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89  Henry Pottinger to William Chaplin, 27 January 1821, MSA, EIC, Judicial Department: Civil 
Judicature, Vol. 10/11, 1821-3. 
90  Perhaps refers to a yachita, which in Hindu law is a form of deposit that the holder may have use 
of.  A nakl is a copy or transcript. 
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side, Succo Punt Aptay could have had no difficulty in fabricating one to suit his 
purpose.”91 
 
 The accumulated evidence of improper procedures in the case eventually led 
Pottinger to set aside the second award and to restore the original sarounsh. 
Although he was “averse to speak harshly” of Hockley’s motives, he indicated to the 
Deccan Commissioner that Hockley had acted improperly by espousing the cause of 
the one of the parties.92 Moreover, the full extent of Hockley’s corruption was 
becoming too obvious to ignore. Pottinger discovered that several of the same people 
were repeatedly involved in disputed panchayat cases under investigation. Nilkunt 
Myraul, for example, had been the complainant whose suit had landed the 
Warrekur’s gomashta in jail a year earlier; and, another man, Moro Bulwunt, had 
served as a punchayatdar for the opposing side in both the Warrekur’s and Sukhoo 
Punt’s case. Eventually, Pottinger would discover that Hockley had extorted over Rs. 
30,000 from litigants in return for favorable panchayat decisions and be dismissed 
from the Company’s service.93 
 
 Pottinger had long held that he had “but one object in view which was to see 
justice done in the affair.”94 However, the path to justice was obstructed in a number 
of ways. Most apparent in these cases were the numerous instances of the corruption 
of procedural justice that was fundamental to panchayat justice. As in the other case 
described here, the production of valid documents, the valid representation of 
interests, and the avoidance of elements of compulsion and coercion were framed by 
litigants to constitute the normative foundations of justice and fairness.  
 
 In conclusion, corruption may commonly occur when public offices are 
treated as “maximizing units” for personal gain. However, victims of corruption 
during this period may have experienced corruption in quite different ways. The 
principal narrative structure of these stories instead revolve around procedural 
injustices, that is, when the commonly-accepted practices of application, awards, and 
the constitution of panchayats were violated.   
 
 One must be careful nevertheless to avoid coming to the conclusion that these 
cases therefore indicate that violations of procedural justice were more important to 
litigants than the actual act of graft or extortion. Instead they suggest not only that 
litigants had a clear understanding of the issues and concepts that would appeal most 
to their British administrators, but also that British investigators actively participated 
in the construction of the litigants’ narratives to fit their preconceptions of propriety 
and legitimacy. Therefore, textual evidence in the form of written awards, written 
memoranda, signatures, and other forms of written as well as evidence of 
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correspondence to British practices of arbitration, especially voluntariness, came to 
be understood as essential to ensuring success in the panchayat.  
 
 As Martin Chanock has explained in the case of African customary law under 
the British, the process of taking evidence, examining witnesses, and the like was 
part of a more general project by British administrators to “discover” the rules of 
customary law.  Yet this process of “discovery” inevitably led not only to the 
stultification of law, but to its partial and perhaps biased recovery. Such legalistic 
procedures as the taking of evidence or the examining of witnesses should therefore 
be understood “not as part of the process of discovering the rules of customary law 
but as a vital part of the rule-making process. What kinds of rules would be made out 
of this process, and how and whether they would be applied, depended on a number 
of circumstances: the rules would reflect the current aims and anxieties of the 
witnesses, and if these coincided with the moral predilections and administrative 
purposes of the officials, a ‘customary law’ might become established.”95  Perhaps 
more than anything else, these cases serve to exemplify this process as Indian 
litigants sought to adapt themselves to the newly-imposed system of British justice at 
the same time that they sought to use the system to project and restructure their 
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